Reinvestigating the Reciprocal Relationship between Democracy and Income Inequality by Knutsen, Carl Henrik
  
Recommended Citation 
Knutsen, C. H. (2015). Reinvestigating the Reciprocal Relationship between Democracy and 
Income Inequality. Review of Economics and Institutions, 6(2), Article 1. doi: 
10.5202/rei.v6i2.173. 
Retrieved from http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/173  
 
Copyright © 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 
 
Review of  
ECONOMICS 
and  
INSTITUTIONS 
Review of Economics and Institutions  
www.rei.unipg.it 
ISSN 2038-1379 DOI 10.5202/rei.v6i2.173 
 Vol. 6 – No. 2, Summer-Fall 2015 – Article 1 
 
Reinvestigating the Reciprocal Relationship 
between Democracy and Income Inequality 
 
Carl Henrik Knutsen* 
University of Oslo 
 
 
 
 
	  
Abstract:	  Few	  social	  science	  relationships	  have	  spawned	  as	  much	  interest	  -­‐	  or	  as	  many	  
elaborate	  theoretical	  models	  and	  arguments	  -­‐	  as	  that	  between	  democracy	  and	   income	  
inequality.	  However,	   the	  empirical	   literature	  has	  generally	  employed	  statistical	  models	  
based	  on	  problematic	  assumptions,	  and	  has	  produced	  quite	  mixed	   results.	  Hence,	   this	  
paper	  makes	  an	  important	  empirical	  contribution	  by	  applying	  models	  that,	  for	  instance,	  
account	   for	   endogeneity	   biases	   and	   control	   for	   country-­‐specific	   effects.	   Despite	   being	  
correlated,	   there	   is	   very	   little	   evidence	   of	   any	   effect	   of	   income	   inequality	   on	   level	   of	  
democracy	  once	  employing	  appropriate	  model	  specifications.	  Furthermore,	   there	   is	  no	  
robust	  evidence	  that	   inequality	  systematically	  affects	  either	  democratization	  prospects	  
or	   democratic	   stability.	   In	   contrast,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	   democracy	   reduces	   income	  
inequality	  when	  inequality	  is	  proxied	  by	  share	  of	  income	  going	  to	  wages.	  However,	  also	  
this	  effect	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  inequality	  measure.	  Democracy	  does,	  for	  instance,	  
not	  reduce	  inequalities	  in	  disposable	  household	  incomes.	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1 Introduction
Does democracy reduce income inequality? Or, does income inequality
affect the prospects for democratization or democratic survival? The empir-
ical analysis in this paper revisits these important questions. It contributes
to the literature by accounting for the possible two-way causal relationship
between regime type and income inequality, but also by acknowledging that
country- and time-specific factors, sample selection biases, and choice of
regime and inequality measures may influence results.
Few social science relationships have generated as much interest as that
between democracy and income inequality, resulting in numerous theoreti-
cal accounts. Several scholars have, quite convincingly, argued that democ-
racy thrives in more egalitarian contexts. However, influential contribu-
tions have also highlighted mechanisms through which high income in-
equality could spur democratization (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
Similarly, an extensive literature explains how democracy may reduce in-
come inequality. But, models producing this implication may rely on too
simplistic assumptions regarding political processes in democracies (e.g.,
Ansell and Samuels 2010), and technological and other structural factors
could matter far more for inequality than political factors (Mulligan et al.
2004). These ambiguities are reflected in the empirical literature, where dif-
ferent contributions find diverging results both for the effect of income in-
equality on democracy and of democracy on inequality.
The lack of any robust aggregate relationship between inequality and
democracy might stem from the relationship being highly contingent on
other factors, such as opposition groups’ capabilities in overcoming collec-
tive action problems or economic openness (see, e.g., Haggard and Kauf-
man 2012; Freeman and Quinn 2012). Nevertheless, previous studies – of-
ten relying on small samples or improperly specified models – may simply
have arrived at the wrong conclusions on whether income inequality has
any net effect on level of democracy (or vice versa). Few empirical studies
have systematically taken endogeneity into account (but, see Rubinson and
Quinlan 1977; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Burkhart 1997, 2007), despite plau-
sible theoretical arguments for a two-way causal relationship. Furthermore,
most studies have included only small subsets of the world’s countries and
used cross-sectional data or time series for a handful years (but, see Houle
2009; Teorell 2010; Timmons 2010; Acemoglu et al. 2013). This could lead
to estimates with low reliability and to sample-selection biases affecting re-
sults.
This paper reinvestigates the relationship(-s) between income inequality
and democracy by employing models that adjust for the above-mentioned
issues. Hence, it makes an empirical contribution to a field already rich in
elaborate theoretical models. Section 2 briefly reviews arguments and re-
sults from the literature. Section 3 presents the data material and discusses
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salient methodological issues. Section 4 first presents empirical models that
– like in most of the literature – assume one-way causal relationships. There-
after, it reports more proper models accounting for endogeneity. There is no
robust effect of income inequality, neither on democracy level, democratiza-
tion probability nor democratic stability. In contrast, democracy seemingly
reduces income inequality when the latter is proxied the share of income
going to wages (see also Rodrik 1999). But, it does, for example, not re-
duce inequalities in disposable household incomes. There are some (non-
robust) indications that one-party dictatorships pursue more progressive
redistributive policies than democracies.
2 Arguments and results from the literature
2.1 Income inequality affects democracy
At least since de Tocqueville, one prominent notion has been that “ex-
treme disparities reduce the sense of community and legitimacy upon which
democracy is supposed to rest” (Bollen and Jackman 1985, 440). In other
words, high income inequality generates unfavorable conditions for democ-
racy. Lipset (1959), for example, argues that democracy is less tenable in
societies with high levels of social conflict, which in turn is generated by
high inequality. A high concentration of economic resources may also un-
dermine democracy, or at least the “quality of democracy” (Diamond and
Morlino 2005), through increasing the concentration of political resources –
for example in terms of influence over legislators, the judiciary, and the me-
dia (see, e.g., Dahl 1989; Grossman and Helpman 2001; Przeworski 2010).
Political-economic models also suggest that income inequality affects
regime type: Under democracy, the relatively poor median voter deter-
mines policy, preferring higher tax rates and more redistribution than rich
voters (Meltzer and Richard 1981). In right-wing dictatorships, in contrast,
the rich control government, inducing lower taxes and less redistribution.
Hence, different social groups have clear preference-rankings over regime
types, and income inequality may crucially affect the willingness (and the
capabilities) of actors to fight for their favored regime. Despite these com-
mon assumptions, different political-economic models produce conflicting
implications on exactly how inequality affects democratization prospects:
Boix (2003), for example, proposes a non-linear relationship, drawing on
a model where there is asymmetric information on whether the rich elite
is actually capable of suppressing the poor. Yet, lower inequality most of-
ten induces higher probability of democratization in Boix’ model; the rich
have less to lose from the poor determining tax rates in egalitarian societies.
Rich elites therefore more easily agree to demands for democracy, without
risking a fight, when inequality is low. In contrast, Acemoglu and Robin-
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son’s (2000) model implies that higher inequality increases democratization
chances. In unequal societies the poor have (particularly) much to gain
from democratization, and the rich are unable to credibly commit to future
redistribution under dictatorship. In a later study, Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2006) propose that the combination of lower demand for democracy
and the higher willingness by elites to supply democracy in egalitarian soci-
eties – and the opposite in inegalitarian societies – generate a hump-shaped
relationship between inequality and democratization probability. Yet, the
above-discussed models all rely on potentially problematic assumptions,
for instance that non-elite actors are able to solve collective action problems
when challenging existing regimes (Kuran 1989; Houle 2009; Haggard and
Kaufman 2012), or by failing to distinguish distinct elite groups with very
different interests (Ansell and Samuels 2010). Thus, it remains unclear in
what direction we would expect income inequality to affect democratiza-
tion chances (and level of democracy), and how strong we should expect a
potential link to be.
The evidence on the relationship between income inequality and democ-
racy is then also mixed. Bollen and Jackman (1985, 1995) find no robust rela-
tionship, whereas Muller (1988, 1995), using alternative specifications, finds
that high inequality reduces democratization probability. Boix (2003) and
Boix and Stokes (2003) also report that low inequality induces democratiza-
tion, using Gini coefficients on income inequality and the “Family Farms”
measure from Vanhanen (1997). However, Ansell and Samuels (2010) find
that whereas lower land inequality indeed enhances democratization prosp-
ects (see also Ziblatt 2008), lower income inequality may have the opposite ef-
fect. Yet, even the estimated impact of income inequality, more specifically,
may depend on choice of measure; Przeworski et al. (2000) find that low in-
come inequality induces democratization – but only when using wage and
capital shares of income as proxies. Other recent contributions argue that
the links between income inequality and democracy only operate under cer-
tain conditions – for example, in countries that are strongly integrated in the
global economy and financial system (e.g., Freeman and Quinn 2012) – thus
explaining the non-robust net relationship. Regarding democratic survival,
Przeworski et al. (2000) and Houle (2009) report that high income inequality
destabilizes democracies, although other studies fail to identify a clear re-
lationship between high inequality and democratic reversals (Teorell 2010).
Still, most these studies have in common is that they do not account prop-
erly for inequality perhaps being endogenous to regime type, and this may
affect the reported results.
2.2 Democracy affects income inequality
To illustrate the above point, Houle – who proposes a democracy-stabiliz-
ing effect of low inequality – notes that “most stable democracies that are
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poor turn out to be very equal. Some examples include India, Costa Rica,
Uruguay, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia” (Houle
2009, 595). But, consider one of Houle’s examples, Mauritius. This African
island-state was quite inegalitarian at decolonization. Mauritian society was
agrarian, with the most important export product being sugar produced on
large plantations. The plantation owners – the “Grande Blanches” of Euro-
pean origin – constituted only 1-2 percent of the population, but accounted
for much of national income. Democracy seems to have introduced pres-
sures for redistribution, however: From 1965 to 1987 Mauritus’ Gini coeffi-
cient was reduced from 0.50 to 0.37, likely affected by redistributive polices
promoted by the regime (Brautigam 1997, 58). Various democratic Mau-
ritian governments expanded schooling opportunities and health-care ac-
cess, and introduced progressive taxes. Furthermore, the regime spent tax
revenue from sugar production on building up an effective textile sector,
where poor women constituted a majority of workers. Hence, the proposi-
tion that democracy is stabilized by low inequality is, at best, only part of
the Mauritian story.
Interestingly this interpretation of Mauritian history – emphasizing that
democracy reduced inequality – is congruent with contributions to the the-
oretical literature on how inequality affects democracy. The main reason why
inequality matters for democratization in the models of Boix and Acemoglu
and Robinson is that both elites and non-elites consider democracy a vehicle
for progressive redistribution. Acemoglu et al. (2013) finds that democracy
increases the share of income going to taxes (but, see also Aidt and Jensen
2013), which might, in turn, be used for progressive redistribution. The
authors also replicate the result that democracy increases (secondary level)
education spending, which likely has progressive consequences (see also
Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993; Lake and Baum 2001). Further, Lindert (2005)
reports that the expansion of democratic participation rights induced higher
social welfare spending and widened access to education in 19th century
Europe, thus contributing to reduced inequality.
However, democratization processes of later decades have not been char-
acterized by gradual expansion of participation rights in previously oli-
garchic regimes, but rather by transitions from various regimes without
competitive elections towards democracies with formal participation rights
for all citizens (Miller 2014). The predicted effects on inequality from such
transitions are not as clear cut, and depend, for instance, on the type of
dictatorship prior to democratization. Single-party regimes with winning
coalitions drawn from the working classes might produce more extensive
redistribution than democracies (e.g., Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson
2006). Indeed, the survey in Gradstein and Milanovic (2004) indicates that
there may be a more pronounced effect of franchise expansion than of other
democratiza-tion-related processes on inequality. The considerations above
could contribute to explain why Mulligan et al. (2004), employing data from
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1960–1990, find no robust effect of democracy on a range of redistributive
policies (see also, e.g., Cheibub 1998).
More generally, democratic politics does not necessarily follow the “dis-
tributional-game” pattern of the models by Boix and Acemoglu and Robin-
son, but is often more complex with multiple issue dimensions and class-
cutting alliances (e.g., Bollen and Jackman 1985; Ansell and Samuels 2010).
Further – as detailed in a large political science literature on democracy in
developing country contexts (e.g., Chabal and Daloz 1999), and recently
highlighted by Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Albertus and Menaldo (2014) –
a de jure democracy may be congruent with de facto concentration of power
in the elites’ hands, leading to “captured democracy” with little redistribu-
tion.1 Finally, autocracies may not behave as in standard political economic
model either; autocracies differ in terms of their institutional make-up and
other characteristics, and several autocratic regimes have strong reasons to
pursue redistributive policies to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et
al. 2003; Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Knut-
sen and Rasmussen 2014). Taking such factors into account may alter the
expected redistributive effect of democracy.
Despite an uncertain effect on progressive transfers, democracy may affect
inequality through other channels. For instance, democracy may reduce
pre-tax income inequality through increasing wages for workers and reduc-
ing the income-share going to capital owners. Rodrik (1999) and Przeworski
et al. (2000) find that democracy enhances wages partly because of higher
productivity, but also because of higher income-shares for labor (but, see
Acemoglu et al. 2013, Appendix A). One reason could be that democracies
more strongly protect freedom of association (Møller and Skaaning 2013),
leaving employees with better opportunities to organize and bargain for
higher wages than under dictatorship (see Deyo 1998).
A number of empirical studies have found that democracy generates
more egalitarian income distributions (e.g., Muller 1988; Li et al. 1998;
Chong 2004). However, other studies indicate the relationship is inversely
U-shaped, and several early studies find no robust effect (see Sirowy and
Inkeles 1990; Gradstein and Milanovic 2004). Also the recent and meth-
odologically solid study by Timmons (2010) finds no robust effect of democ-
racy on income inequality. Yet, as for studies of how inequality affect regime
type, most studies on how regime type affect inequality have failed to prop-
erly account for endogeneity biases, country- and time-fixed effects, and
potential sample selection biases. These are all addressed below when em-
pirically reinvestigating how democracy affects income inequality, and vice
1 Interestingly, Acemoglu et al. (2013) also suggest that democracy may increase in-
come inequality through promoting structural transformations to the economy (notably
from agriculture to manufacturing), and through reducing barriers to entry for new en-
trepreneurs. This may, in turn, lead to larger market-induced inequalities in gross in-
come, with a new group of citizens making a very good living under democracy.
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versa.
3 Data and methodology
Section 3.1 presents the data material and operationalizations, centering
on the income inequality and regime type measures. Thereafter, Section
3.2 discusses salient challenges to studying the causal relationship between
democracy and income inequality, focusing on reciprocal causality and re-
lated endogeneity biases, but also discussing sample selection issues.
3.1 Measurement and data sources
Most existing inequality indices lack extensive time series and many
only cover a subset of countries globally. This is problematic, as lacking cov-
erage reduces the precision of estimates and may induce sample-selection
biases. For instance, despite the strenuous efforts underlying the World In-
come Inequality Database (WIID), its Gini coefficients are measured infre-
quently with irregular time intervals for most countries. Moreover, the data
are heterogeneous regarding “the definition of income and income recipi-
ent, ... the proportion of the population covered, and the nature of the data
collection procedure, which makes international comparisons exceedingly
difficult” (Gradstein and Milanovic 2004, 521). Such variation in measure-
ment methodology has consequences for the ranking of, and distance be-
tween, countries (Lambert 2001).
However, one inequality proxy with fairly extensive coverage is the share
of total income allocated to wages, or “wage share” (WS). WS is constructed
from INDSTAT2 data (UNIDO 2011) on manufacturing-sector incomes. The
data cover 163 countries, with maximum time series from 1963–2008. A
low WS is, in practice, often related to high income inequality; in most so-
cieties the relatively poor are wage-earners, and the few very rich draw in-
come from rents to capital, land or other non-wage sources of income (Ro-
gowski 2009). WS is perhaps particularly suitable for testing the relation-
ships posited in the political-economic models discussed above that cen-
ter on elite–citizenry income disparities and related group preferences over
regimes:
“when the major conflict is between the rich and the poor,
one variable that captures inter-group inequality is the share of
labor income in GDP. The reasoning here is that, whereas the
poorer segments of society obtain most of their income from la-
bor, capital income (and sometimes land income) accrues largely
to a smaller elite. Therefore, a high labor share corresponds to a
low level of inter-group inequality when conflict is between rich
and poor” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 59).
There are, however, legitimate criticisms of WS as a measure of inequal-
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ity (Timmons 2010), and the analysis below therefore also tests other in-
equality measures. First, WS relates to how gross income is distributed (be-
tween capital and labor) before taxation and government transfers. Since
such policies may be endogenous to regime type, models using WS may
generate biased results if inequality is conceptualized in disposable-income
terms. Furthermore, WS only uses manufacturing-sector data, and does not
consider distribution of tertiary sector income. WS also leaves out income
distribution among landowners, peasants and agricultural workers, which
may relate to democratization prospects (Ansell and Samuels 2010; Ziblatt
2008). Finally, WS does not separate between payments to, for instance,
manual laborers and CEOs (Timmons 2010); a high score could reflect high
salaries for the latter.
Hence, using more conventional Gini coefficients have some benefits.
Gini coefficients are based on calculations of the cumulative income (or
consumption) of citizens (or households) – ranked according to personal
income – as shares of national income (see Lambert 2001). However, there is
far more missing for most Gini measures – even in the extensive World In-
come Inequality Database (WIID) (UNU-WIDER 2008) gathering data from
numerous sources, notably including the Deininger and Squire dataset –
than for WS. Second, the comparability of Gini estimates between differ-
ent surveys is often questionable. WIID includes Gini coefficients measur-
ing the distribution of income and of consumption and includes both gross-
and disposable income estimates. Third, the survey-based data – sometimes
from specific regions within a country – may be associated with unsystem-
atic and systematic measurement errors.
Various solutions have been implemented to deal with the above prob-
lems. Gerry and Mickiewicz (2008), for instance, employ rules for selecting
only comparable, high-quality Gini estimates from WIID, when investigat-
ing the determinants of income inequality in 24 post-communist countries.
They, e.g., first exclude consumption-based Ginis and data not stemming
from representative samples, before employing rules on preferred defini-
tions, sources, and methodologies. Below, I run robustness tests on Gini
coefficients extracted from WIID2c using a resembling, although not as de-
tailed, approach: First, observations are kept only if the income sharing unit
is a household, family or tax unit. Second, observations are kept only if the
income definition relates to net/disposable income. Third, only equivalence-
scale adjusted observations are kept. 1982 Gini observations remain, but
many are from identical country-years; in such instances, the country-year
score is the average of the remaining Ginis. Another approach to obtaining
comparable Gini estimates is pursued by Galbraith and Kum (2005), who
estimate Gini coefficients from a regression on Deininger and Squire high
quality Gini coefficients with measures of manufacturing pay inequality,
manufacturing employment to population, and dummies for Deininger and
Squire data sources as independent variables. Below, also this Gini measure
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is used for robustness testing, and so is the Gini measure from the World
Development Indicators (WDI).
However, in addition to models using WS, the below discussion cen-
ters on tests using Gini coefficients from the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID; Solt 2009) Version 3.1. Solt draws on the vari-
ous, but not directly comparable, Gini coefficients in the WIID, and employs
a more complex missing-data algorithm to standardize the information. The
Luxembourg Income Study is chosen as basis for the standardization, due
to its high quality and comparability of estimates across countries. Solt then
follows a careful procedure that allows maximizing coverage and precision
of estimates, while still ensuring comparability (see Solt 2014). Importantly,
Solt constructs separate estimates for market- and disposable household in-
come inequality.
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics on measures of income inequality
Inequality measure Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wage share 3471 36.66 14.31 1.67 140.94
SWIID market income Gini 4035 44.65 9.13 17.59 77.97
SWIID disposable income Gini 4100 38.19 10.52 15.39 71.33
Galbraith and Kum Gini 3249 40.70 7.02 19.81 64.36
WDI Gini 768 42.61 10.14 20.96 74.33
WIID extracted disp. househ. Gini 1060 36.20 10.77 16.63 63.18
Top 1% income share 809 8.65 3.11 2.65 21.30
Note: The statistics are reported for all observations in the dataset.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the various inequality measures,
and Table 2 reports their bivariate correlation coefficients. As Table 1 shows,
the measures vary greatly in terms of coverage. Whereas WS and the Gini
measures that invoke some form of prediction/multiple imputation model
for generating scores (Galbraith and Kum and SWIID) cover around 3-4000
observations, the other measures cover about 1000 observations or less. How-
ever, only WS incorporates a very extensive number of “observed” data-
points. Further, Table 2 shows that there is, most often, only a modestly
strong correlation between the measures. WS correlates most strongly with
the WIID extracted Ginis (-0.56), whereas the absolute value of the correla-
tion with the other Gini measures is lower than 0.4. The various Gini coef-
ficients display bivariate correlations, with each other, ranging from 0.42 to
0.94.
Another fascinating – and widely acknowledged (particularly after the
publication of Piketty 2014) – effort to collect comparable measures of in-
come inequality relates to the World Top Incomes Database, which pro-
vides different variables on share of income going to the top (or bottom)
X percent of income earners. While these measures are easy to interpret,
the database currently covers less than 30 countries, many of which are
high-income OECD countries. Thus, these data are only used for validation
testing: One concern with WS is that it may be becoming a poorer proxy
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Table 2 - Bivariate correlation coefficients for various inequality measures
Wage share Disp. Solt Market Solt G & K WDI WIID Top 1%
Wage share 1 (3471)
Disp. inc. Gini (Solt) -0.38 (2683) 1 (4100)
Market inc. Gini (Solt) -0.08 (2630) 0.76 (4035) 1 (4035)
Galbraith and Kum Gini -0.39 (2793) 0.69 (2390) 0.52 (2326) 1 (3249)
WDI Gini -0.29 (410) 0.91 (716) 0.79 (716) 0.42 (263) 1 (768)
WIID extr. Gini -0.56 (787) 0.94 (999) 0.61 (999) 0.77 (617) 0.93 (365) 1 (1060)
Top 1% income share -0.54 (578) 0.61 (666) 0.31 (666) 0.47 (498) 0.81 (51) 0.72 (249) 1 (809)
Note: The bivariate correlation coefficients are reported for all observations in the dataset with data on the two
inequality measures in questions. Number of country-year observations in parenthesis.
of overall inequality over time, particularly in more developed countries,
since it draws data from the manufacturing sector only; many countries are
transitioning to post-industrial, service-intensive economies. Nevertheless,
inequalities in the manufacturing sector might still correspond fairly closely
with inequalities in other sectors, and WS would then perform decently as
an (overall) inequality proxy. Figure 1 displays the time trend in the bivari-
ate correlation coefficient between WS and share of income going to the top
1% income earners. The two graphs in Figure 1 – one for all countries with
data and one only for OECD countries – show that the correlation has been
consistently negative (as expected), but has varied in strength over time.
While the correlation was weaker in the 1980s than in the 1960s and 70s,
it has actually turned much stronger from 1990 onwards (see Figures A.1
and A.2 in the Online Appendix for top 5 and 10 percent income measures).
Hence, WS does not seem to become a poorer proxy for overall inequality
over time, even as the manufacturing sector shrinks, at least in many rich
OECD countries.
The widely used Polity Index (PI) is the baseline democracy measure. PI
goes from -10 to 10 (most democratic), and incorporates indicators on com-
petitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness and
regulation of participation, and checks on the chief executive (Marshall and
Jaggers 2002). The PI thus covers different components of the democracy
concept. However, ‘political inclusiveness’ is insufficiently accounted for
(Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Gates et al. 2006). Given the above-noted
theoretical focus on political inclusiveness – particularly related to suffrage
rights – tests are also conducted employing the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP)
index from Gates et al. (2006). SIP combines various Polity indicators with
Vanhanen’s Participation indicator measuring share of the population par-
ticipating in elections. Other tests use the Freedom House Index (FHI). FHI
has several validity and reliability problems, but incorporates subjective in-
dicators on how political institutions function in practice (e.g., Munck and
Verkuilen 2002).2 Nominally democratic institutions may not ensure the im-
plementation of redistributive policies (e.g., Przeworski 2010; Acemoglu et
2 One particular problem with the FHI in this setting, is that at least 1 of its 25 indicators
is, arguably, conceptually related to income inequality (“Is there equality of opportunity
and the absence of economic exploitation?”), generating an a priori relation.
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 10
Knutsen: Reinvestigating the Reciprocal Relationship between Democracy and Income Inequality
Figure 1 - Bivariate correlation coefficients, by year, between share of income going
to wage earners in manufacturing sector (WS) and share of total income going to top
1% income earners.
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Notes: The top graph displays correlation coefficients from all countries with data (minimum 6, maximum 18 for
particular years) and the bottom graph for OECD countries with data (minimum 5, maximum 11).
al. 2013), and de facto protection of political and civil rights may be more
relevant for distributional outcomes. Finally, tests are also reported for the
Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) measure from Cheibub et al. (2010) and Uni-
fied Democracy Scores from Pemstein et al. (2010). Table A.1 in the Ap-
pendix presents descriptive statistics for the various democracy measures
and Table A.2 in the Online Appendix reports their pairwise correlations.
There is a positive and moderately strong correlation between WS and
PI (.32; 3317 country-year obs.). However, this correlation could stem from
other variables systematically affecting both regime type and income in-
equality. The regression models below therefore include several controls:
First, they include (log) PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita (p.c.) from Mad-
dison (2007), measured in 1990 USD. The relationships between income
level and inequality (Kuznets 1955) and between income level and democ-
racy (Przeworski et al. 2000) may, however, be non-monotonic, and the
models therefore also controls for log GDP p.c. squared. Moreover, an econ-
omy dominated by natural-resource extraction may stabilize dictatorships
(Ross 2001) and increase income inequality (Leamer et al. 1999). Hence,
the models control for log (oil and gas income p.c.+1) using data from Ross
(2011). They also control for log population level from Maddison (2007), and
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for log (regime duration+1), based on Polity IV data, since political instabil-
ity may relate both to regime type and distributional aspects (Alesina and
Perotti 1996). Table A.3 in the Online Appendix reports descriptive statistics
for these variables.
3.2 Pertinent methodological issues when investigating the
causal links between democracy and inequality
Different factors may generate a correlation between democracy and in-
equality, and need to be accounted for when investigating potential causal
effects. In addition to the control variables listed, most models below con-
trol for country- and year fixed effects. However, there is another pertinent
concern: As indicated by the review above, democracy may both cause and
be affected by income inequality. Estimating these effects without account-
ing for endogeneity therefore likely leads to biased results. The few studies
that explicitly model the democracy–inequality relationship as reciprocal
draw on limited data and have generated quite mixed results. Rubinson
and Quinlan (1977) include 32 countries with data from 1965–1975, finding
that inequality enhances democracy, whereas democracy does not affect in-
equality. Bollen and Jackman (1985) include 60 countries, with inequality
measured once during 1958–1975; they find no robust effect in either direc-
tion. Burkhart (1997) uses data from 56 countries for four points in time.3
His results indicate that improvements in democracy increase inequality at
low democracy levels, but reduce inequality at high democracy levels. Like-
wise, modest income inequality generates the best prospects for democracy.
The above-mentioned studies rely on instrumental-variable approaches, but
their choices of instruments may have generated biases.4
Therefore, different models accounting for endogeneity biases are em-
ployed below, drawing on data for about 3000 observations from 120 coun-
tries. The first such specifications are fixed effects two stage least squares
(FE2SLS) models. For studying the causal effect of democracy on inequal-
ity, two valid instruments – i.e. measures correlated with the endogenous
independent variable, but not directly related to the dependent – are iden-
tified: The first instrument, WAVE, has previously been applied in analyz-
ing democracy’s effects on property rights and economic growth (Knutsen
2011a,b). WAVE is based on Huntington’s (1991) observation that democ-
racy, globally, has thrived in temporal waves, with set-backs during “reverse-
waves”. The waves reflect sources of regime-type variation exogenous to
3 For a relatively similar analysis, see Burkhart (2007).
4 Burkhart, for instance, uses many of the same instruments in the first stages of both the
democracy and inequality models. As the exclusion restriction, somewhat simplified,
states there should be no direct effect of the instruments on the dependent variable in
the second-stage equation, this is problematic. It is, for example, inconsistent to assume
energy consumption is a proper instrument for democracy in the inequality model, and
then assume they are unrelated in the democracy model.
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domestic economic outcomes, as they proxy for changes in the international-
political environment affecting democracy prospects and spill-over effects
from regime changes abroad. WAVE is scored 1 where the reigning regime
originated within the (reverse-wave) periods 〈, 1827], [1922, 1942], [1958, 1975],
[1998, 2003], and 0 otherwise. RPRI, which was constructed to investigate
democracy’s effect on different types of inequality (Huber et al. 2011), is
the second instrument. RPRI also uses the international context as source of
exogenous variation, taking the current regime’s inception date as point of
departure. RPRI records average Polity-score of other countries in the geo-
graphic region at the date of the country in question’s last regime change.
These instruments correlate very strongly with current regime type, and
there is little theoretical reason – and this is also clearly supported by overi-
dentification tests presented below – to fear that they are directly related
to inequality (when controlling for all the covariates). In contrast, I have
been unable to identify any instrument for income inequality both satisfy-
ing the “strong instrument” criterion and the exclusion restriction.5 Thus,
one needs a different strategy to investigate how inequality causally affects
regime type.
The empirical analysis therefore contains different GMM models that
treat inequality as an endogenous regressor to investigate the latter effect. It
also presents GMM models for investigating the effect of regime type on in-
equality – then with regime type as endogenous regressor. The GMM mod-
els include Arellano-Bond, or difference GMM, models, which use lags of
levels as instruments for the first-differences of the endogenous regressors
(Arellano and Bond 1991). Despite its many beneficial properties, Arellano-
Bond models perform sub-optimally for slow-moving variables, such as
democracy and inequality. Blundell and Bond (1998), using Monte Carlo
simulations, show that system GMM models – which augment the Arellano-
Bond instrumentation strategy for endogenous regressors by also instru-
menting for levels with lags of differences – perform better in such contexts.
Hence, the analysis below reports system GMM models as well.
Different GMM specifications are tested and evaluated on the basis of
relevant diagnostics tests (see, e.g., Roodman 2009a), notably Arellano-Bond
Ar(x) autocorrelation tests and Hansen-J tests for overidentifying restric-
tions. Arellano-Bond Ar(2) autocorrelation tests, for example, often indi-
cate that models with inequality as dependent variable should include two
lags of the dependent as regressor, whereas one lag is sufficient for models
5 Acemoglu et al. (2008) use lagged savings rates as instrument when investigating the
impact of income level on democracy. I tested both 5- and 10-year lagged savings rates
as instruments for inequality – the ‘Kaldor Hypothesis’ proposes that rich capital owners
save higher shares of their incomes; savings rates and inequality might thus correlate.
Yet, while overidentification tests indicate the exclusion restriction holds, savings rates
turn out to be very weak instruments. Hence, such FE2SLS models unsurprisingly fail to
identify any significant effect of inequality on democracy, this is actually in line also with
the more credible GMM results presented below.
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having democracy as dependent. Following Roodman (2009b), most mod-
els below restrict the number of lags used for instrumentation to reduce the
overall number of instruments. Having substantially more instruments than
cross-section units may lead to failure to exclude the endogenous compo-
nent of the instrumented regressors and difficulties in detecting this through
standard (Hansen J) tests.
The initial analysis is conducted on panel data where country-year is
the unit of analysis, thus including around 3000 country-year observations.
However, these models are complemented by running otherwise equivalent
models on 5-year panel periods, as is common, for example, in the economic
growth literature. The former has the advantage of increasing efficiency of
estimates by including more information. It also allows for more appro-
priately capturing effects if they operate with a short time-lag. However,
the latter approach also has advantages. First, both regime type and in-
come inequality are, as noted, both slow-moving variables, and capturing
short-term dynamics may thus not be as important as smoothing out ran-
dom measurement errors by averaging over multiple years. This approach
may also partly alleviate endogeneity concerns, if the independent variable
is measured early in the 5-year panel, or if one lags the independent vari-
ables by one panel unit (as below). Increasing panel length also reduces the
number of instruments in the GMM models and thus mitigates the “too-
many-instruments problem” (Roodman 2009b). Finally, averaging over 5-
year periods alleviates problems with missing data, which is particularly
pertinent for many of the Gini measures, if one does not require coverage for
every year in the panel to provide a score. It should, however, be noted that
one underestimates the uncertainty inherent in the scores by doing this, as
short-term fluctuations and measurement errors in particular years become
more influential. But, there are other ways of dealing more systematically
with missing data:
Despite having far better coverage than most other inequality data sour-
ces, INDSTAT2 and SWIID still contain a substantial amount of missing.
This generates less reliable coefficient estimates. But, what is far worse,
the data may not be missing at random, and omitting these observations
could produce biased coefficients. For example, if most democracies, but
only dictatorships with strong concerns for redistribution, report data, one
might underestimate the effect of PI on WS. Inspection of the data substan-
tiates concerns of sample-selection biases. For example, whereas the aver-
age (0–100 normalized) PI score for observations with WS data is 63, it is
42 for those missing WS data. Furthermore, the average GDP p.c. (1990
USD) for country-year observations with WS data is 7147, and only 3558 for
those missing data. Hence, multiple imputation was employed to predict
missing values, using Amelia II software (Honaker and King 2010). The re-
sults reported below draw on 10 imputed datasets, reporting average coef-
ficients and imputation-corrected errors. The datasets include 124 variables
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– selected because they are anticipated to be informative predictors of in-
equality or regime type, and have fairly good empirical coverage (see Figure
A.4 in the Online Appendix for a missingness map). The datasets include
184 countries with maximum time series from 1960–2008. The imputation-
algorithm assumes second-order polynomial, country-specific time trends.
The imputation model performs fairly well, as illustrated by the over-
imputation plot for WS (Figure A.4), showing how the imputation model is
able to accurately “predict” actual scores on WS – except for the very high-
est scores – when treating them “as if” they were missing. Also time-series
plots (such as Figure A.6 in the Online Appendix) suggest that the imputa-
tion model mostly produces sensible predictions.
4 Empirical analysis
Section 4.1, presents “naive” baseline models on how inequality affects
regime type and on how regime type affects inequality. As in most of the
empirical literature, these models do not account for endogeneity biases.
Section 4.2 then employs more appropriate model specifications investigat-
ing the effect of inequality on regime type. Finally, Section 4.3 reports more
appropriate specifications for investigating how regime type affects income
inequality.
4.1 Baseline models
Table 3 shows models with regime type, measured by PI, as depen-
dent variable (henceforth “democracy models”), and models with income
inequality, proxied by WS, as dependent variable (“inequality models”).
WS measures income share going to wages in percent, and PI is also nor-
malized to vary from 0–100. This normalization does not affect the t-values,
but eases comparisons of the size of the estimated effects (of democracy on
inequality and vice versa) by setting WS and PI to equivalent scales. The
baseline models are Ordinary Least Squares with Panel Corrected Standard
Errors (OLS PCSE) (see Beck and Katz 1995). Initially, country-year is unit
of analysis, independent variables are lagged one year, and errors are ad-
justed for panel-level heteroskedasticity and AR(1) autocorrelation within
panels (countries). The baseline democracy and inequality models are, re-
spectively:
PIi,t = β0 + β1WSi,t−1 + β2GDPi,t−1 + β3GDPSQi,t−1 + β4OILINCi,t−1
+ β5POPi,t−1 + β6REGDURi,t−1 + i,t
WSi,t = β0 + β1PIi,t−1 + β2GDPi,t−1 + β3GDPSQi,t−1 + β4OILINCi,t−1
+ β5POPi,t−1 + β6REGDURi,t−1 + i,t
The results from these naive baseline models (AI and AIV) are presented
in Table 3. The models contain around 3000 observations from 120 countries,
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Table 3 - Baseline models, and models accounting for year- and country-specific
effects
AI AII AIII AIV AV AVI
PCSE PCSE FE PCSE PCSE FE
Ind.var. \Dep.var. Polity Polity Polity Wage share Wage share Wage share
b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t) b/(t)
Wage share 0.086*** 0.185*** 0.237**
(2.86) (4.76) (2.46)
Polity 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.064***
(3.69) (4.55) (2.91)
Ln GDP p.c. 19.442 33.533* 88.519** -37.153*** -16.391** -27.788
(0.92) (1.66) (2.05) (-4.06) (-2.53) (-1.22)
Ln GDP p.c. sq. -0.025 -1.242 -5.230* 2.461*** 1.068*** 1.686
(-0.02) (-0.99) (-1.96) (4.41) (2.71) (1.22)
Ln oil/gas inc. p.c. -3.273*** -0.955** -0.030 0.274 -0.242 0.093
(-4.43) (-2.20) (-0.05) (1.38) (-1.16) (0.18)
Ln population 7.683*** 0.452 -7.058 -0.796* -0.774** 1.850
(4.92) (0.27) (-0.55) (-1.78) (-2.01) (0.37)
Ln regime duration -2.636*** -2.648*** -6.698*** 0.232 0.158 0.013
(-4.74) (-5.22) (-4.83) (0.96) (0.69) (0.03)
Ethnic fraction. 0.378 -2.111
(0.05) (-0.87)
E.Europe–Soviet -15.056* -7.666***
(-1.93) (-3.58)
S.S. Africa -26.334*** -7.907***
(-2.66) (-2.72)
Asia -11.077 -16.614***
(-1.50) (-6.99)
Middle E.–N.Afr. -49.771*** -3.498
(-7.09) (-1.26)
Latin America -3.199 -9.676***
(-0.31) (-3.19)
British colony 12.773*** 1.124
(2.76) (0.72)
French colony -4.408 4.180**
(-1.08) (2.46)
Portuguese col. 8.842 -8.790***
(0.81) (-3.07)
Spanish colony 1.578 -6.210***
(0.19) (-2.88)
Belgian colony 4.459 -13.858***
(0.62) (-5.57)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 3026 3011 3026 3031 3015 3031
Countries 120 119 120 120 119 120
Note: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. T-values in parentheses. Wage share is dependent variable in Models
AI–AIII and normalized Polity (0–100) in AIV–AVI. Errors in OLS PCSE models are adjusted for panel-specific
AR(1) autocorrelation and panel-level heteroskedasticity. Errors in fixed effects models are clustered by country.
Year dummies and constant are omitted from table. Maximum time-series is 1964–2008 in AI–AIII and 1963–2007
in AIV–AVI. Independent variables are lagged one year.
which are listed in Table A.4. The two models show statistically significant
“effects” at 1 percent, both of inequality on democracy and of democracy on
inequality. Hence, if we are to believe these models, low income inequal-
ity enhances the level of democracy, and more democratic regimes induce
lower inequality. However, the estimated size of the two “effects” are not
very large. To illustrate, changing from a situation where 20 percent of total
income goes to wages to a situation where 60 percent goes to wages expect-
edly increases PI by less than 4 percent of its total range, according to the
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point estimate in Model AI. This is not a substantial democratization. Re-
garding the effect of regime type on inequality, Model AIV indicates that
the kind of democratization experienced in the Philippines with the fall of
Marcos – from 30 to 90 on the PI – would increase the percentage-share of
income going to wages with around 3.
The estimates in Models AI and AIV may, however, be affected by omit-
ted variable bias. One concern relates to systematic time trends in income
inequality (Rogowski 2009) and in regime characteristics (Huntington 1991).
The baseline models are therefore expanded by including year-dummies.
Also different geographical, socio-cultural, and political-historical factors,
could impact on both regime type and inequality (Engerman and Sokolo
1997; Acemoglu et al. 2008). Thus, Models AII (democracy model) and AV
(inequality model) also add the Ethnic Fractionalization Index from Alesina
et al. (2003) and dummies for geographic region and historical colonizer.
Still, there may be other consequential country-fixed characteristics, and
Models AIII and AVI thus include both country- and year-dummies. Yet,
controlling for time- and country-fixed characteristics does not weaken the
estimated relationships between democracy and income inequality: The es-
timate from Model AIII, for example, indicates that an increase in WS from
20 to 60 increases PI by around 9.5 percent. Furthermore, a democratization
akin to that in the mid-1980s Philippines (from 30 to 90) would, accord-
ing to Model AVI, increase WS with about 4. Hence, the results in Table 3
suggest that democracy reduces income inequality, and that low inequality
enhances the level of democracy. This is replicated also for similar models
run on 5-year panels (Table A.6), and when controlling for education (Table
A.7), although the significance is weakened for the “effect” of inequality on
democracy in the latter models. Yet, these results are only preliminary: De-
spite controlling for country- and year-fixed effects, the models in Table 3
do not account for endogeneity biases.
4.2 Further investigating how inequality affects democracy
I first turn to scrutinizing the (potential) causal effect of inequality on
regime type. The baseline models above suggested that lower levels of in-
equality lead to more democratic regimes. Yet, this is seemingly not the
case according to most of the GMM Models with inequality as dependent
variable, reported in the Online Appendix. These models draw on quite dif-
ferent specifications (e.g. 1-year versus 5-year periods as panel unit), data
samples (only observed versus also including imputed data), and measures.
Importantly, however, they all treat inequality as endogenous and account
for both country- and year-fixed effects.
To be more specific, Table A.8 reports five Arellano-Bond and five Sys-
tem GMM specifications with country-year as unit of analysis, PI as depen-
dent variable, and WS as the (endogenous) measure of democracy. These
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/173 17
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 2 - Summer-Fall 2015, Article 1
include models with one and with two lags of the dependent variable as
regressors; models treating only WS as endogenous and models treating all
regressors except the year dummies as regressors; and, models with dif-
ferent restrictions on lags used for instrumentation. 4 of these 10 models
report a negative WS coefficient, whereas 6 report a positive. WS is always
insignificant even at 10 percent, with one single exception. Furthermore,
this exception – an Arellano-Bond model including one lag of WS as regres-
sor and using only the second lag for instrumentation – is not appropriately
specified, as indicated by the low p-value (0.02) on the Arellano-Bond Ar(2)
autocorrelation test.
Indeed, only models including two lags of WS as regressors yield p-
values above 0.10 on the Ar(2) test. Two of these models – one Arellano-
Bond and one System GMM model – are reproduced as BI and BII in Table
4. These models are also associated with sufficiently high p-values on the
Ar(3) and Hansen J-tests. Further, the number of instruments in BI is be-
low the number of cross-section units, whereas it is slightly above in BII.
Taken together, BI and BII should thus provide consistent results, and they
report that changes in WS do not systematically affect PI. Hence, there are
no clear indications that inequality systematically affects democracy once
accounting for inequality being endogenous.
This (non-)result is fairly stable. For instance, it holds up in various
twostep-GMM specifications (see Table A.9). However, due to the numer-
ous time periods in the country-year panel set-up, it is difficult to model
other regressors than PI as endogenous – at least while relaxing restrictions
on lags used for instrumentation – without increasing the number of instru-
ments far beyond the number of cross-section units. Thus, the Appendix
contains several models where 5-year periods (starting with 1960–1964) are
the panel units; the variables are provided their average score during the
5-year period in question, and all independent variables are lagged one 5-
year period to further mitigate endogeneity concerns. These models mostly
replicate the non-result from the 1-year specifications (see, e.g., Table A.10),
with a few exceptions. One is Model BIII in Table 4, which is an Arellano-
Bond specification with two lags of the dependent variable (WS) as regres-
sors, and modelling only PI as endogenous. In BIII, there is a weakly signif-
icant (t=1.7) positive effect of WS on PI, but whereas the Ar(2) and Hansen
J-test p-values (barely) exceed 0.10, the p-value for the Ar(3) test is 0.04.
In contrast, all the different test statistics indicate that Model BIV – where
the entire set of regressors are endogenous, but only 3–5 lags are used for
instrumentation – is consistent, and here WS is actually negative, but sta-
tistically insignificant (t=-0.4). This result is reproduced in BV (t=-0.3 for
WS), the System GMM version of Model BIII, although the test-statistics are
more problematic for this model. In any case, there is no clear evidence that
inequality systematically affects democracy according to the 5-year panel
models either.
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The lack of a clear result holds true also, for instance, when making ad-
justments to the set of controls, such as adding average years of education
in the population (above 25 years old), with data from the Barro and Lee
dataset (see Barro and Lee 1993, results are reported in Models BVIBVII, Ta-
ble 4 and Appendix Table A.12).6 The weak results may, however, be due
to measurement problems with PI, or to PI not capturing relevant aspects
of democracy. Casper and Tufis (2003) show how even highly correlated
democracy measures give different results in regressions estimating the de-
terminants of democracy. Models using (mean) Unified Democracy Scores
from Pemstein et al. (2010) were therefore also tested. PI was also substi-
tuted with SIP (Gates et al. 2006), to check whether inequality impacts on
a democracy measure incorporating differences in electoral participation.
Moreover, high income inequality may negatively impact on the function-
ing of democratic institutions, for example through intensifying social con-
flict and increasing incentives for elites to subvert formally granted polit-
ical and civil rights (e.g., Dreze and Sen 2002). Thus, inequality might be
more strongly related with the FHI than indices measuring formal institu-
tions. However, the lack of robust results is replicated when substituting
the PI with either SIP, UDS or FHI (see Tables A. 19–21). The various GMM
models were also modified by including squared WS-terms as endogenous
regressors, to investigate whether intermediary levels of inequality induce
democracy (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). However, there is no evi-
dence of such a hump-shaped relationship either.7
Despite these findings, two other methodological explanations could ac-
count for the lack of an estimated causal effect of inequality on regime type.
The first relates to choice of inequality measure and data. The second relates
to systematic missingness and resulting selection biases that may blur a po-
tential net causal effect from being revealed in the GMM estimates. How-
ever, further investigation indicates that this is not the case:
First, WS was substituted with the various Gini measures. Gini coeffi-
cients arguably provide more direct measures of overall income inequality
than WS, but collecting data and comparing Gini coefficients without limit-
ing the number of observations too much, is complicated. As noted, the pro-
cedure and data provided by Solt (2009) constitute a very good attempt to
resolve these issues. SWIID draws on standards set by the Luxembourg In-
come Survey, the rich data material in WIID, and multiple imputation mod-
els to produce comparable estimates of both market and disposable income
inequality. If anything, the results are even weaker for the Solt measures,
as illustrated by the system GMM models BVIII and BIX with the market
6 It should, however, be noted that most models controlling for education level performs
very poorly on the Ar(2) test, and may thus produce inconsistent results.
7 Actually, the squared WS-terms are positive and significant at 5 percent in two System
GMM models in Table A.11. The point estimates indicate a negative marginal effect of
WS on democracy for inegalitarian countries and a (weaker) positive marginal effect for
very egalitarian countries.
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(t=-0.72) and disposable (t=0.23) income Ginis, respectively, as endogenous
regressors.8
Equivalent GMM models were also run using Gini indices from the other
data sources. Models employing the Galbraith and Kum (2005) Gini, the
WDI Gini, and Gini data extracted directly from the WIID on household
disposable incomes (using the above-described algorithm) are reported in
Tables A.16 – A.18. In general, the choice of inequality measure does not
matter much; there is no clear net effect of income inequality on democ-
racy. One exception relates to the System GMM specifications employing
the extracted WIID Gini data: Four of five such models in Table A.18 show
a statistically significant (at least 10 percent) Gini, and actually indicate that
higher inequality increases democracy. Nevertheless, these models only draw
on about 350 5-year period observations from around 95 countries, and all
models may be affected by the too-many-instruments problem. In the Sys-
tem GMM model with fewer instruments than countries – which also pro-
duces acceptable p-values for the Ar(2) and Hansen tests – the effect is in-
significant (t=0.45).
Second, the datasets generated by the multiple imputation model, de-
scribed in Section 3.2, were employed. The null-result might stem from
missing data reducing the precision of the estimates, or even generating
biases. Whereas Models BI and BII contain around 3000 country-year ob-
servations, the models including imputed data exceed 7000 observations
from more than 180 countries. The multiple imputation was conducted
on the country-year version of the dataset, so calculating the appropriate
imputation-corrected standard errors over the ten imputed datasets is only
feasible for this format. This is therefore the baseline, but additional tests
are conducted on a collapsed 5-year period version.9
Some models including imputed data show support for the hypothesis
that low levels of income inequality – at least when proxied by WS – induce
more democratic regimes. More specifically, 3 of the 12 GMM specifica-
tions reported in Table A.37 show a positive and significant WS at 5 percent
(whereas three other models show a negative, but insignificant WS). How-
ever, there are about 6 times as many instruments as countries in two of
these specifications. The only appropriate specification – an Arellano-Bond
model with one lag on the dependent variable and using only the second
lag for instrumentation – is reported as Model BX in in Table 4. Here, the
t-value of WS is 2.7. However, System GMM specifications with relatively
few instruments – and that perform well on the Hansen J-test and Ar(2) test
(though not the Ar(3) test) – show no effect of WS. These models include
8 For the Gini coefficients, high values indicate higher inequality; see also Tables A.14 and
A.15.
9 For the latter, variable-scores are averages over the ten imputed datasets, and errors are
not imputation corrected. Thus, these models underestimate the errors by failing to ac-
count for the data being imputed rather than observed (see, e.g., Honaker and King 2010).
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the two System GMM models reported as BXI and BXII in Table 4. There
is some evidence that WS increases democracy also from the 5-year panel
models (see Table Table A.39), although one should keep in mind that the
standard errors here are not imputation corrected. However, this evidence
is at best mixed – as suggested by contrasting the weakly significant coef-
ficient in the Arellano-Bond Model BXIII with the statistically insignificant
coefficient in the System GMM model BXIV. Furthermore, as Table A.38 re-
porting models using the Solt market income Gini illustrates, there are no
indications of any effect when employing various Gini coefficients rather
than WS. In sum, there is no robust evidence that low inequality induces
democracy.
4.2.1 Separating between effects on democratization and democratic sur-
vival
The lack of any robust effect of inequality on democracy level may, how-
ever, be due to inequality having quite different effects on democratization
and on democratic stability. Making this distinction, Houle (2009) does not
find that low inequality enhances democratization. However, he does find
that low inequality stabilizes existing democracies. I reinvestigate this by – as
Houle does – running dynamic probit models. Some specifications, employ-
ing the control variables from above, are reported in Table A.43. The table
includes models using WS and the SWIID market income Gini as inequality
measures, and different democracy measures: PI is dichotomized by classi-
fying all country-years that score ≥ 6 on PI (-10 to 10) as democracies, and I
also employ the dichotomous DD, or ACLP, measure distinguishing democ-
racies from dictatorships according to whether contested elections exist or
not (Cheibub et al. 2010).
I tested different specifications – also other than those reported in Table
A.43 – and neither the effect on democratization nor on democratic stabil-
ity is robust. The models using DD and WS provide some indications that
higher inequality spurs democratization, as suggested by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000). However, the result turns insignificant when exchanging
either the democracy or the inequality measure. The more surprising find-
ing, in light of the results in Houle (2009), is that the inequality–democratic
stability relationship is also very sensitive. Houle uses WS as inequality
measure and DD as democracy measure. My model using these measures,
and including year-specific effects, replicates Houle’s main result; lower in-
equality significantly (5 percent) enhances democratic stability. This result
is also retained in the model including year-specific effects and using di-
chotomized Polity. Still, including year-specific effects on both democrati-
zation and democratic survival leads to serious collinearity issues and the
sample being approximately halved. When excluding year-specific effects,
there is no significant relationship between WS and democratic survival
even at 10 percent. Furthermore, no model using SWIID Gini coefficients
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report anything close to significant effects on democratic survival.10
In sum, the main result in Houle (2009) – low inequality stabilizes democ-
racies – is not robust.11 The findings above correspond well with those of
Teorell (2010), who fails to identify any robust effect of income inequality
on either democratic “upturns” or “downturns”. Hence, the evidence is
simply very weak for any (non-conditional) effect of income inequality on
transitions to and from democracy.
4.3 Further investigating how democracy affects inequality
Rodrik (1999) finds that democracy enhances wages, but how robust is
this relationship to accounting, for example, for endogeneity and sample-
selection biases? The analysis below suggests it is fairly robust, although
it does not hold across all plausible specification choices.12 Nevertheless,
there are indications that democracy increases the share of income going
to wages. The evidence is far weaker when it comes to the link between
democracy and inequality when the latter is measured by the various Gini
coefficients.
The analysis includes both FE2SLS and GMM models, treating democ-
racy as an endogenous independent variable. As already noted in Section
3.2, WAVE and RPRI are valid instruments for democracy in regressions
where inequality is considered the effect-variable. This goes, for instance,
for the FE2SLS Model CI in Table 5 with PI as democracy measure and WS
as inequality measure: First, WAVE and RPRI are very strong instruments,
as evidenced by first-stage t-values of, respectively, -17.8 and 21.9. The Sar-
gan overidentification test also indicates the estimator is consistent (p=0.32).
Indeed, CI reports a positive significant effect (1 percent) of PI on WS. The
estimated causal effect of “full democratization” on PI is a 6 point increase
in the percentage-share of income going to wages. Although not robust to
the choice of inequality measure (see Table A.22), the positive causal effect
holds up when using different democracy measures, as illustrated by CII
employing UDS (t=3.1; Sargan p=0.28).13 Also when substituting WS with
10 This non-result is even clearer when including imputed data to account for sample selec-
tion biases. This is, for instance, clear from Table A.44, but the non-robust link between
inequality and democratic survival has also been replicated for different model speci-
fications and datasets based on other imputation models for previous working paper
versions.
11 Furthermore, the dynamic probit models presented here and in Houle (2009) do not ac-
count for the endogeneity of inequality. I tried out different instrumental variables dy-
namic probit models, but they did not converge.
12 This is also demonstrated by Acemoglu et al. (2013, 44–46), who report that Rodrik’s
results are not completely robust when employing models more closely resembling Ro-
drik’s original specification.
13 I also tested a Treatment-Effects selection model (Greene 2003, 787-789), applying the
dichotomous DD measure. In the first-stage equation, DD is considered a function of the
controls, RPRI and WAVE. This model indicates that democracy – also when measuring
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/173 23
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS, Vol. 6, Issue 2 - Summer-Fall 2015, Article 1
the disposable income Gini from Solt (2009) in Model CIII, there are indica-
tions of democracy reducing income inequality (t=-1.9; Sargan p=0.78).
Also the baseline GMM models run on the country-year panels mostly
report a positive and significant PI when WS is the dependent variable (see
Table A.23).14 Some of these models also seem well-specified according to
the Ar- and Hansen J-test statistics. For example, Model CIV is an Arellano-
Bond model including only one lag of WS as regressor, with an Ar(2)-test p-
value of 0.32, Hansen p-value of 0.20, and fewer instruments than countries.
PI is significant at 10 percent, and the estimated short-term effect of full de-
mocratization is a 7.6 point increase in WS. When accounting for multiplier
effects via the lagged dependent variable, the estimated long-run effect is a
substantial 10.5 increase in the share of total income going to wages. In the
equivalent System GMM model (CV), the effect is significant at 1 percent.
Here, the estimated short-term effect of full democratization is lower (5.7),
but the long-term effect is higher (20.4). To illustrate, the latter is substan-
tially larger than even the difference in WS scores (14.3) between Sweden
and the (far more inegalitarian) US in year 2000.
The results are somewhat more mixed, but still point in the same di-
rection, when employing 5-year panels. Table A.25 reports 12 different
Arellano-Bond and System GMM specifications, for instance varying the
number of lags used for instrumentation and varying whether only PI or
the whole set of regressors are considered endogenous. All 12 models show
positive PI coefficients, ranging from 0.02–0.11, and 6 (7) of these coefficients
are significant at 5 (10) percent. Two of these models are also reported, as
CVI and CVII, in Table A.5.15 As shown in the Appendix, this pattern (a
positive effect of democracy on WS that is often significant, but not robust),
holds up also in two-step models and models using different democracy
measures on the 5-year panels. Further, the results are quite similar, al-
though slightly weakened, when also controlling for education (see Table
A.27). This is exemplified by Model CVIII, which controls for average years
of education for the adult (25+ years) population with data from Barro and
Lee. The point estimate is fairly high (0.088), but the t-value is only 1.6.16
only its contestation component – reduces income inequality (p-value=.003). Going from
dictatorship to democracy is estimated to increase WS by 10.7.
14 Two-step versions of these GMM models more often generate insignificant results, but
the point estimates are fairly sizeable and similar to those in one-step models (see Table
A.26).
15 Yet, it should be noted that the Ar(2) test p-value for Model CVII is very low.
16 Nevertheless, controlling for education may take out an important channel through
which democracy reduces inequalities, potentially inducing post-treatment bias. Demo-
cratic regimes may incentivize politicians to provide broad-based education systems, and
not only elite education, to please large groups of voters, as theorized in various contri-
butions (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993; Lake and Baum 2001) and identified in empirical
contexts such as 19th century Europe (Lindert 2005) and post-colonial Africa (Stasav-
age 2005). This might provide lower-income citizens with the requisite human capital to
increase their productivity and wages, potentially also reducing aggregate inequality.
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The results for the 1-year (Table A.40) and 5-year panels (Table A.42) also
mostly hold up when employing the imputed datasets: Democracy thus
seems to boost the share of income going to wages, even when address-
ing potential sample selection biases. However, many models including
imputed data encounter problems either with the Ar- or Hansen tests, indi-
cating these models may provide inconsistent results after all. This is exem-
plified by Models CXI and CXII on 1-year panels, and by Models CXIII and
CXIV on 5-year panels.
In sum, the analysis does not provide unequivocal support for Rodrik’s
hypothesis that democracy increases wages. However, there is, at the very
least, no evidence that democracy reduces WS. One could go further and
note that the many different model specifications generally point in the
same direction, and that an overweight of the evidence indicates that democ-
racy does, indeed, increase wages. This positive estimate is reported in
some models that account for sample-selection biases, the endogeneity of
democracy, and country- and year-fixed effects. To the extent that WS is a
good proxy, democracy seems to generate more egalitarian income distribu-
tions. There is, however, one additional concern that should be addressed,
namely how choice of inequality measure affects estimates:
When running GMM models similar to above, but with the different
Gini coefficients rather than WS as dependent variable, there is surprisingly
little evidence of any inequality-reducing effect of democracy. Some Sys-
tem GMM models using the WDI Gini (Online Appendix Table A.33) or
WIID-extracted disposable household Gini (Online Appendix Table A.35)
even indicate that democracy increases inequality. Figure 2 illustrates the
lack of correspondence between the WS and (for the sake of easing com-
parisons, reversed) WDI Gini measure for selected countries, and how this
may influence inferences on democracy and inequality: Autocratic China
has traditionally had relatively high Gini-scores and low WS-scores. China’s
Gini has, however, been declining over the sample period, whereas WS has
not changed much. In contrast, the US’ Gini-score has held relatively con-
stant since 1960, whereas WS has decreased sharply. Poland and Malawi
illustrate that also post-democratization changes in Gini and WS may go
in different directions. Poland experienced reduction of its relatively high
(reversed) Gini after democratization in the early 1990s, whereas WS in-
creased throughout the decade. In contrast, Malawi’s WS score was rel-
atively unchanged after democratization, whereas its (reversed) Gini in-
creased sharply.
Yet, there are, as discussed, problems with using the WDI and WIID
data, particularly related to small sample sizes and potential for systematic
selection biases. Hence, I tested GMM models using SWIID Gini data. WS
measures share of gross income going to wages. It is therefore natural to ro-
bustness test the models above using the SWIID market income Gini. How-
ever, as Online Appendix Table A.31 indicates, such models fail to iden-
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Figure 2 - Democracy and inequality in China, Malawi, Poland, and The United States.
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Notes: The figure shows normalized (0–100) annual PI, WS and (reversed) WDI Gini scores; high values indicate
relatively democratic or egalitarian scores.
tify any inequality-reducing effect of democracy. When running these 12
models on the imputed datasets, two models find a significant inequality-
reducing effect of democracy at 5 percent (Table A.41), but another specifi-
cation actually shows a significant inequality-increasing effect of democracy.
It could be that democracy reduces inequality in disposable income through
promoting more progressive taxation systems and redistributive transfers.
Yet, there is no clear evidence of this either. As Table A.31 and the selected
Arellano-Bond model CX in Table 5 exemplifies, there is no evidence from
the GMM models (as opposed to from the FE2SLS model CIII) of any effect
of democracy on the disposable income Gini.
4.3.1 Do various types of autocracies differ in inequality and redistribu-
tion?
The most obvious explanation for the divergent results on the inequality-
reducing effect of democracy involves pointing to the poor quality of in-
equality data. If we treat all the measures discussed above as problematic
proxies of (the same type of) income inequality concept, interpreting the
mixed results boils down to acknowledging that there is a lack of robust-
ness to the relationship. However, democracies may generally be good at
increasing the wages of workers, whereas at least some types of autocracies
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pursue quite extensive redistributive strategies, for instance in the form of
social welfare and educational policies (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Knut-
sen and Rasmussen 2014), with important consequences (only) for disposable
income inequality measures.17 In particular, several one-party dictatorships,
both Communist and non-Communist, have relied on extensive redistribu-
tion to their relatively large winning coalitions. The Soviet Union (see Mi-
lanovic 1998) and Mexico under the PRI (see Magaloni 2006) are examples
of party-based regimes combining extensive taxation or expropriation with
subsequent redistribution to numerous relatively poor supporters. Such re-
distribution is captured by disposable income Gini coefficients, but not by
WS (or market income SWIID Gini).
To investigate this further, I utilize data from Hadenius and Teorell (2007)
and run models separating between monarchies, military regimes, one-party
regimes, multi-party autocracies, other autocracies (including no-party re-
gimes), and democracies.18 Appendix Table A.45 reports OLS PCSE mod-
els using WS, the two SWIID Ginis, and the redistribution measure from
Solt (2009) based on differences between the two SWIID Ginis as dependent
variables. No dictatorship type is associated with higher WS than democ-
racies. Indeed, monarchies, military regimes and multiparty autocracies are
all associated with a significantly (5 percent) lower WS. The monarchy coef-
ficient indicates an 11.2 point drop in WS when going from a democracy to
an autocratic monarchy.
Monarchies are also less egalitarian than democracies when using mar-
ket income and disposable income Ginis as dependent variables. However,
none of the other autocracy types are associated with significantly lower in-
equality than democracy on the Gini measures, and democracy does not
outperform any autocratic regime type on progressive redistribution.
The most interesting result relates to the one-party dummy. Models us-
ing WS and the market income Gini do not find that one-party regimes have
significantly different income inequalities from democracies. When apply-
ing the disposable income Gini, however, one-party regimes are seemingly
associated with lower inequality. The weakly significant coefficient might be
due to several one-party regimes – including a sizeable number of Commu-
nist regimes – pursuing extensive redistribution of income to their relatively
poor winning coalitions through different programs (Haggard and Kauf-
17 Interestingly, the democracy–inequality relationship may depend, more generally, on
whether we measure inequality between groups (as WS; separating wage earners and
capital owners) or individuals (as Gini coefficients). Huber et al. (2011) find that democ-
racy reduces inequality between ethnic groups, but not within-group inequality or over-
all inequality. Hence, the notion that democracy mainly mitigates between-group in-
equalities – also when groups are not distinguished by ethnic characteristics – may con-
stitute a viable explanation for the diverging results above.
18 Hadenius and Teorell (2007) separate democracies and dictatorships by taking the aver-
age of normalized (0–10) scores on the PI and FHI, and set a threshold of 7.5 for being
coded as democratic on this index.
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man 2008; Knutsen and Rasmussen 2014). This notion is further supported
when employing the redistribution measure from Solt (2009); the one-party
dummy remains significant, albeit only at 10 percent. Yet, these results are
from robust, and it is thus premature to draw any clear conclusions on re-
lationships between different types of autocracies, income inequality and
redistribution.19 Still, the fact that there is no evidence, whatsoever, for any
positive relationship between democracy and redistribution is noteworthy.
5 Conclusion
Fascinating theoretical work has been produced on the interrelationship
between income inequality and democracy. Several empirical studies have
also been conducted on whether and how income inequality affects democ-
racy, and on whether and how democracy affects inequality. However, these
studies have failed to fully account for different, potentially important, bi-
ases. When applying models that simultaneously adjust for country- and
year-fixed effects as well as endogeneity bias, the analysis above suggests
that there is no effect of income inequality on level of democracy. The non-
results could, in principle, be due to income inequality having quite differ-
ent effects on the probabilities of democratization and democratic survival.
High inequality might, for instance, increase democratization prospects –
through inducing grievances among the poor and reducing the credibility
of elite commitments to redistribute (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000) – but
impede democratic stability (Houle 2009). Nevertheless, the result that low
inequality stabilizes existing democracies is very sensitive, and so is the re-
lationship between inequality and democratization. In sum, there is little
evidence that income inequality causally affects democracy in any simple
and systematic manner.
In contrast, democracy seems to increase the share of income going to
wages (see also Rodrik 1999), even when accounting for endogeneity and
country- and year-fixed effects. Since wage earners are generally poorer
than capital owners, this result also indicates that democracy reduces in-
come inequality. However, there is no evidence of democracy reducing
inequality – neither in gross nor in disposable income – when applying
Gini-coefficient data from, for instance, the WIID or SWIID. Furthermore,
some results indicated that one-party dictatorships may be associated with
more redistribution and more egalitarian disposable income distributions
than their democratic counterparts. Despite also these results lacking in
robustness, they point to the potential importance of nuancing the regime
19 When running GMM models accounting for the endogeneity of regime type, the one-
party coefficient often changes sign (see Table A.46). The other results are also quite
sensitive. As indicated by the changes from Table A.45 to A.46, monarchies, for instance,
may not increase inequality after all; it may rather be that monarchies form and survive
in already inegalitarian contexts.
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variable in future research.
The clearest conclusion, however, is that choices of measures matter.
Most notably, the inequality-reducing impact of democracy only holds when
using WS. It is tempting to pursue substantial conclusions based on the di-
verging findings: Democracy reduces the inter-group inequality between
wage earners and capital owners – possibly because democracies allow for
freedom of association, including the freedom to form independent unions,
thereby strengthening labor’s bargaining power. Yet, democracy does not
reduce broader societal inequalities, neither in terms of gross nor disposable
incomes. While tempting, I would caution against prematurely drawing
these conclusions. To the extent that all democracy and inequality measures
tap common conceptual cores – and are associated with different reliability
and validity issues – it may be safer, at this point, to conclude that there is
no robust support for any causal effect (in either direction). With the data at
hand, we simply do not have strongly founded knowledge of any aggregate
effect of democracy on inequality, or of inequality on democracy.
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